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TO SEE OR NOT TO SEE THE DEFENDANT: EXPANDING
THE USE OF FLORIDA'S SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR
TAKING THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES
GLENN F. LANG*
I. INTRODUCTIONAT BOTH the 1989 and the 1990 Regular Sessions of the Florida
Legislature, lawmakers introduced bills to make special proce-
dures currently available for the testimony of an alleged child victim
of certain abuse offenses available to "aged persons" and "disabled
adults."' Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, currently provides a
hearsay exception for certain statements of a child victim of abuse.2
Florida law also provides for the presentation of a child victim's testi-
mony at trial by means of videotape or closed-circuit television.'
The hearsay exception makes a child's statements admissible with-
out the child testifying in the presence of the defendant. Before such
statements are admissible, however, the testimony must meet certain
requirements. 4 The videotape and closed-circuit television procedures
each contain special provisions permitting a child to give his or her
testimony outside of the presence of the defendant if the testimony
satisfies certain conditions set out in the particular statute.' All of
these statutes have been the subject of considerable legal controversy. 6
Similar controversy has surrounded comparable statutes in other
states. 7
* Staff Director, Committee on Judiciary, The Florida Senate. A.B., Sociology, 1974,
Washington University; M.S., Criminology, 1977, Florida State University; J.D., 1984, North
Carolina Central University. Mr. Lang is the author of a Senate staff report, A REVIEW OF 1989
PROPOSED LEGISLATION AMENDING FLORIDA STATUTES RELATING TO EVIDENCE, infra note 350, a
portion of which contained recommendations concerning the proposed legislation which is the
subject of this Article.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and do not represent the
views of any other individual, or any association, organization, or institution, public or private.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Katherine Chandler for her dedication in typing the
original manuscript.
1. See infra notes 343-48 and accompanying text.
2. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(1989).
3. See id. § 92.53 (videotape); id. § 92.54 (closed-circuit television).
4. See id. § 90.803(23)(a)-(c).
5. See id. § 92.53(l),(4),(7) (videotape); id. § 92.54(l),(4),(5) (closed-circuit television).
6. See infra notes 222-81 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 158-216 and accompanying text.
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In its recent decision in Maryland v. Craig,8 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld Maryland's closed-circuit television statute
against a challenge that it violated the defendant's constitutional right
of confrontation, The statute provided for taking the child's testi-
mony outside of the presence of the defendant. 9 While the Craig deci-
sion may have settled one legal controversy surrounding such statutes,
it is unlikely that it represents the final challenge to such laws.
This Article presents some of the legal and practical questions left
unanswered after the Craig decision and suggests the Florida Legisla-
ture carefully consider these questions before making Florida's special
procedures for child testimony available to any other category of wit-
ness. One can understand the legislative proposals to expand the use
of Florida's special procedures only in relation to the procedures cur-
rently available in Florida and other jurisdictions. Part II of this Arti-
cle traces the historical development of special procedures for child
testimony and presents the psychological research on such procedures.
The Article discusses the statutes and case law governing special pro-
cedures for children in Part III. Part III also examines the statutes in
those few states which make special procedures available for the disa-
bled or the elderly. In Part IV, the Article examines Florida legislative
proposals to make the current special procedures available to aged
persons and disabled adults. Part V raises certain legal and practical
questions inherent in such proposals and concludes that the Florida
Legislature should give careful consideration to these questions before
deciding to expand the use of special procedures for witness testi-
mony.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Perspective
The movement in the legal community to protect child victims and
witnesses from the rigors of trial testimony traces back to a law review
article published in 1969.10 In that article, David Libai offered two
proposals to protect child victims. The first dealt with taking the
child's testimony at trial;" the second set out a special procedure for
taking the child's testimony prior to trial. 2
8. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
9. Id. at 3161.
10. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977 (1969).
11. See id.at 1014-25.
12. See id. at 1028-32.
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Under the first proposal, a child victim would give testimony at trial
in a "child-courtroom."' 13 The courtroom's design would allow the
court to take the child victim's testimony in an informal and relaxed
manner.' 4 The child would give his or her testimony in a "judge's
room" arranged to contribute to the child's security and psychological
comfort. 5 Only four people would be in the judge's room with the
child: the judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and a "child exam-
iner.' ' 6 A one-way mirror would separate the accused, the jury, and
the public from the judge's room and enable them to observe every-
thing that occurs there.17 The author was of the opinion that "Itihe
Child-Courtroom protects, by technological means, the essence of the
accused's right to confront the child witness at trial."'' 8
The "child examiner" would have almost exclusive responsibility
for the interrogation of a child victim of a sexual offense.' 9 The exam-
iner would have training in the dynamics of human behavior and ex-
perience in interviewing techniques so as to be able to balance the
competing interests of protection of the child and efficient investiga-
tion. 2" The examiner would interview the child victim as soon after the
alleged crime as practical. 2' The interview would be videotaped and
would be available for introduction at the trial. 22
The second proposal would grant a "special hearing" for the child
victim. 23 The purpose of this proposal would be to take the child's
testimony in the child-courtroom after the accused's arrest but before
the trial so that the child could testify and forget about the offense as
soon as possible. 24 Since the function of the special hearing would be
to take the child's testimony for submission as evidence at trial, the
prosecution would fully inform defense counsel of the charge, grant
the defense access to all the evidence in the prosecution file, including
the recording of the child's story as told to the child examiner, and
give the defense the opportunity for full cross-examination of the
child.25 "A significant advantage of holding the special hearing in the
13. See id. at 1016-17.
14. Id. at 1017.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1020.
19. Id. at 986-1003.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1028.
24. Id. at 1028.
25. Id. at 1029-30.
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Child-Courtroom is that a confrontation between the accused and the
child can be had without the accused, the jury, and the public being
seen by the child." 26
The court would record the special hearing on videotape for presen-
tation at trial. 27 Libai saw the child's testimony in the special hearing
as closely analogous to the former testimony hearsay exception with
the advantage that the jury could observe the witness's demeanor. 21
The author was confident the special hearing procedure would over-
come any Confrontation Clause or hearsay objections. 29 As the fol-
lowing discussion shows, Libai's proposals were more than a decade
ahead of their time.
One commentator noted that "[iun the late 1970's it became appar-
ent that many sexual assault victims were children." 30 Concurrently, a
movement began whose purpose was to establish the rights of victims
and witnesses.3' In 1977, the federal government funded two programs
devoted specifically to accommodating children as victims or wit-
nesses. 32 Thus, the stage was set for the initiation of a movement to
enact state legislation providing specific protection to child victims.
In a 1982 law review article, Jacqueline Parker revived, refined, and
expanded upon Libai's proposals and drafted state legislation to im-
plement her proposals. 33 For example, instead of Libai's "child exam-
iner," Parker proposed a "child hearing officer" (CHO). The CHO
would be "a specially trained attorney that the State employed to act
as counsel and advocate for a child victim witness . . . . 34 The court
would appoint the CHO whenever the State began an investigation of
a crime against a child. 5 The CHO would have standing to move the
court for a variety of procedures designed to protect the child victim
or witness from trauma. 36
With respect to the child's testimony, Parker offered two proposals
similar to Libai's. The State could take a "special deposition" of the
26. Id. at 1030.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1030-31.
29. See id. at 1030-32.
30. Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 167 (1985) (citing AT-roRNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE ON FAMI.Y VIOLENCE, Fn AL REPORT
(Sept. 1984)).
31. Seeid. at 168.
32. Id. at 168-69.
33. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator? 17
NEw ENG. L. REv. 643 (1982).
34. Id. at 665.
35. Id. at 666.
36. Id. at 666-67.
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child in a "child hearing courtroom" and offer the deposition at trial
in lieu of the child's live testimony. 37 This proposal mirrors Libai's
"special hearing". 3 At trial, the court could take the child's testi-
mony using "special testimony," wherein the child could not see the
defendant, the jury, or the public, but they could see the child
through a one-way mirror or via closed-circuit television.3 9 This pro-
posal embodies Libai's "child-courtroom".4°
Parker advocated broader use of her refined version of Libai's pro-
posals. While Libai would apply his proposals only to child victims of
sexual offenses, Parker would have her proposals apply to child vic-
tims of other crimes as well. 4 1 Additionally, she would have her pro-
posals apply to a non-victim child who is a witness in a criminal case
or in civil litigation such as removal of the child from an abusive par-
ent, tort cases involving mental distress, and divorce proceedings. 42
In the same year that Parker published her article, the American
Bar Association (ABA) published a report which contained numerous
recommendations to improve the disposition of civil and criminal
child sexual abuse cases.43 One recommendation established the under-
lying philosophy for the entire set of recommendations. It called for
the use of innovative approaches to protect the child from further
abuse, to prevent additional trauma to the child and family, and to
treat the child, family, and where appropriate, the offender."4
The ABA made several recommendations to prevent additional
trauma to the child by modifying aspects of the legal process per-
ceived as being especially harmful. 45 As a general principle, the report
recommended that in criminal cases, the court keep "in person" testi-
mony by the child to a minimum. 46
The recommendation encompassed two parts. First, the report rec-
ommended that a child who was a victim of sexual abuse should tes-
tify at preliminary hearings or grand jury proceedings only if needed. 47
As an example of how to implement this part of the recommendation,
37. Id. at 668-69.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
39. Id. at 669.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
41. Id. at 647.
42. Id. at 656-664.
43. NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, YOUNG
LAWYERS DIVISIoN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL IN-
TERVENTION IN INTRAFAM.Y CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES (1982) [hereinafter RECOMENDATIONS].
44. Id. at 6.
45. See id. at 9.
46. See id. at 11-12.
47. Id. at 11.
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the commentary noted state statutes which provided for the use of
videotaped depositions of the child victim's testimony in a criminal
sex offense case."
The second part of the recommendation called for the development
of procedures to avoid the need for the child's testimony in open
court when necessary to prevent trauma to the child. 49 The commen-
tary noted Libai's proposed creation of a special "child-courtroom, ' 50
but rejected it on the basis of a California case which held that the
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses means the right to phys-
ical face-to-face confrontation.5
The American Bar Association's report also made several recom-
mendations with respect to evidentiary issues in child sexual abuse
cases. One such recommendation was to create a special exception to
the hearsay rule for a child's out-of-court statement regarding sexual
abuse. 52 Such statements would be admissible as long as the child testi-
fies or there is corroborative evidence of the abuse 3.5 The recommen-
dation required the proponent of the statement to give sufficient
notice to the adverse party of his or her intention to use itA4 Before
admitting the statement into evidence, the judge would determine if
admission of the statement would best serve the purpose of the evi-
dence rules and the interests of justice.55 In deciding whether to admit
the statement, the court also was to "consider the age and maturity of
the child, the nature and duration of the abuse, the relationship of the
child to the [alleged] offender, the reliability of the assertion, and the
reliability of the child witness .... ,,56
The commentary to the recommendations noted that the existing
hearsay exceptions, such as those for statements of present bodily
feelings, symptoms, and conditions, and for excited utterances, do not
permit the admission of most statements of child sexual abuse. 57 Thus,
the report recommended the adoption of either a special hearsay ex-
ception, as outlined above, or a "residual" exception, as found in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.5" According to the commentary, "[ilt may
be more sensible to adopt a broader, residual exception than a special
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 11-12.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
51. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 43, at 12 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 34.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 34-35.
58. Id. at 35; see FED. R. Evn. 803(24).
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exception." 9 This would prevent what some perceive as a prolifera-
tion of exceptions which has led to a confusing set of specific rules
and to an excessively categorical and superficial approach to hear-
say.60
Parker's proposals and the ABA recommendations sparked a num-
ber of state legislatures to act. Within three years after publication of
the proposals and recommendations, many states enacted laws reflect-
ing some or all of them. 61 Today, a majority of states have done so.
With respect to the ABA recommendation to admit out-of-court
statements by a child victim of sexual abuse, states have chosen to
ignore the ABA's statement that it may be more sensible to adopt a
residual exception. Instead, they have enacted a special hearsay excep-
tion for such statements. 62 Following Libai's proposal for a "special
hearing" and Parker's parallel proposal for a "special deposition,"
states have provided for the admission at trial of the videotaped testi-
mony of a child victim of sexual abuse. 61
States have embodied Libai's "child-courtroom" and Parker's
"special testimony" innovations in statutes authorizing the taking of
a child victim's testimony at trial in a manner which at some level
removes the child from the open courtroom setting. State laws have
accomplished this by providing for the physical isolation of certain
trial participants, e.g., the victim, the defendant, or the jury, while
simultaneously providing isolated participants access to the proceed-
ing through a one- or two-way mirror or closed-circuit television. 6 4
The ABA recommendations rejected the notion that the court ap-
point an attorney to act as counsel and advocate for the child victim
witness. Appointment of such an attorney was thought to interfere
with the adversary process in criminal cases. 6 Thus, the recommenda-
tions rejected the essence of Parker's proposal for a "child hearing
officer." No state legislature has enacted this concept.
The movement to enact laws protecting the child victim witness
from the stress of testifying at trial lacked an empirical basis. Several
authors who were instrumental in the movement acknowledged this
fact, but called for reform anyway based upon psychiatric literature
59. RECOMWENDATIONS, supra note 43, at 35.
60. Id.
61. Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MLIm
L. REv. 5, 7-8 (1985).
62. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1989).
63. See, e.g., id. § 92.53.
64. See, e.g., id. § 92.54.
65. RECoMNDATIONS, supra note 43, at 9-10.
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or accounts from those who worked with child victims. 6 However, at
least one commentator noted that without empirical data showing
how children react to specific legal procedures, the need for and scope
of special approaches was uncertain. 7 Other commentators urged that
reform should focus on investigative techniques and pretrial proce-
dures which would lessen the trauma to the child during the early
stages of the case.6
Some commentators pointed out that there was no evidence that
children in general cannot testify in open court or that the experience
universally traumatizes children.69 These commentators suggested
that, in fact, the opposite may be true. Both experience and empirical
research showed that for some child victims, participating in the crim-
inal justice system was psychologically beneficial. 70 Thus, Melton sug-
gested that the most effective general strategy for research to facilitate
the protection of child witnesses "would be to identify special vulner-
abilities of child witnesses who have particular psychological or demo-
graphic characteristics, and then test specific interventions or
procedural changes to reduce trauma or foster adaptation in those
groups." 7'
Within the general strategy for research, Melton offered some spe-
cific directions. First, psychologists should identify the individual and
situational factors correlated with the psychological harm of testi-
mony in open court.72 Psychologists could accomplish this by studying
the factors which trigger the reactions of child victims to the legal
process.73 This might provide relevant information for deciding which
cases warrant special procedures. 74
Second, Melton suggested that psychologists might better spend
their energy studying ways to make the present system more respon-
sive. 75 Children's perceptions of the nature of the criminal process
need to be identified, and research must give attention to children's
66. See Libai, supra note 10, at 982-85; Parkersupra note 33, at 644-47 (relying largely on
Libai's work); Bulkley, supra note 61, at 10-11.
67. See Bulkley, supra note 61, at 10.
68. Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Ac-
complished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MIA L. REv.
115, 134 (1985).
69. Berliner, supra note 30, at 174; see also Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amend-
ment: A Psycholegal Dilemma, 40 J. Soc. Issuas 109, 120 (1984).
70. Berliner, supra note 30, at 174-75 (counselors have found this to be true); Melton, supra
note 69, at 120 (citing studies showing that the experience may be cathartic).
71. Melton, supra note 69, at 120.
72. Id. at 119.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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understanding of all of the steps in criminal prosecution, both pretrial
and trial. 76
B. Psychological Studies
The federal government has provided funding for some of the re-
search projects suggested in the literature. In 1985, $2 million in fed-
eral grants became available for projects such as assessing the long-
term impact of child sexual abuse on the victim and studying the ef-
fect on the family of the disclosure of child sexual abuse. 77 Funds also
were available for the development of educational materials geared to
preschool age children and for the development of professional train-
ing curricula for legal, case management, and treatment personnel, in-
cluding techniques for communicating, interviewing, and relating to
children.78 Researchers are only now completing and publishing the
results of many of these projects.
A research team led by Professor Goodman has recently completed
a study which examined the emotional effect on child sexual assault
victims of giving testimony in criminal court.7 9 This research is signifi-
cant because the United States Supreme Court cited the work in sup-
port of its recent decision in Maryland v. Craig.80 The researchers
concluded that for at least some children, testifying in criminal court
has adverse emotional effects .8 "Specifically, a subgroup of children
who testify do not show as rapid or complete improvement as children
who do not testify."'8 2 This conclusion raises a number of issues.
The study involved a sample of 218 child sexual assault victims
from three prosecutorial districts in the Denver, Colorado area.83
From the sample, researchers compared the behavior disturbance of a
group of those who testified in their case, "testifiers", to a matched
control group of those who had not testified, "nontestifiers." Testi-
fiers gave testimony either at preliminary, motion, or competency
hearing, trial, or sentencing. A testifier received psychological tests
76. See id.
77. See 50 Fed. Reg. 25,860-62 (1985).
78. Id.
79. G. Goodman, Emotional Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on Child Sexual Assault
Victims (1989) (submitted to National Institute of Justice for publication)(available at Fla. Dep't
of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
80. 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3168-69 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 205-08. The Supreme
Court also cited a portion of the brief for the American Psychological Association as Amicus
Curiae. The Goodman study was cited extensively in the brief. For a discussion of the brief, see
infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
81. G. Goodman, supra note 79, at 114.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 14-15.
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upon referral of the case for prosecution, prior to testifying, at three
months and seven months after first testifying, and after prosecution
ended. The research team interviewed testifiers immediately before
and after giving testimony.84 The team also observed and recorded
their behavior during testimony. Each testifier was matched with a
nontestifier who received psychological tests upon referral for prose-
cution, and at approximately the same time that the testifier received
follow-up testing.8" The matched pair usually received follow-up tests
within a week of each other.16
The study found that testifying in criminal court had negative ef-
fects for some, but not all, of the child sexual assault victims. 87 The
negative effects were more apparent in the short rather than the long
term; however, these effects were still present, especially for a specific
subgroup of children, after conclusion of the case. 88
On three-month follow-up, the behavior adjustment of the testifiers
and nontestifiers did not differ significantly.89 On seven-month fol-
low-up, the nontestifiers generally showed improvement but the testi-
fiers, as a group, did not. 90 However, within the group of testifiers
about half showed improvement and about half did not. 9' At this sec-
ond follow-up, the researchers identified several factors which pre-
dicted the improvement in the subgroup of testifiers. The predictors
included giving testimony multiple times, maternal support, and cor-
roborating evidence. 92 Thus, the study related the improved behavior
adjustment in the subgroup of testifiers to testifying fewer times, hav-
ing maternal support, and having corroborating evidence of the
abuse.
Children who testified repeatedly had more trauma in their lives,
such as divorce or separation of parents, death of a parent, placement
outside the home, or moving to a new home. 93 The researchers could
not explain the correlation between testifying multiple times and
trauma other than victimization, but they offered some possibilities.
Correlation analyses showed that court observers rated children who
experienced more trauma in their lives as more credible witnesses. The
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id. at 27-28.
86. Id. at 28.
87. Id. at 104.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 53.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 54.
92. Id. at 56.
93. Id. at 47.
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existence of corroborative evidence was also more likely in these chil-
dren's cases. The credibility of such children as witnesses coupled with
the existence of corroborative evidence might incline prosecutors to
take these cases to trial, which, in turn, would require more court ap-
pearances by the children. However, a good case for the prosecution
may be detrimental to the child. While a child who has other traumas
in life may be a more credible witness, thereby leading the prosecution
to call that child to testify numerous times, 94 the research associated
giving testimony numerous times without lack of maternal support
with poor behavior adjustment.
On final follow-up, the nontestifiers and a subgroup of testifiers
continued to improve, but a second subgroup of testifiers did not. 95
The testifiers who did improve were more likely to have had their
cases continued than were testifiers who did not improve. 96 The re-
searchers could not fully explain this relationship, but suggested nega-
tive effects simply may diminish with time.97 Other than number of
continuances, there was no other significant predictor of the
subgroup's improvement by the time of final follow-up. 98
Based upon interviews with the testifiers before and after they testi-
fied, giving testimony was not the ordeal they feared it would be.99
However, despite the general trend for more positive responses to tes-
tifying once it was over, the children's negative feelings about testify-
ing in front of the defendant did not change.'°°
The researchers also observed the testifiers when they were on the
stand. "[C]hildren who were most upset about testifying in front of
the defendant had a more difficult time answering the prosecutor's
questions."'' 1 Further, children who felt threatened by the defendant,
e.g., due to the severity of the assault, appeared to be more anxious
on the stand. However, the manifest anxiety of these children was to
their advantage, because the study concluded that observers perceived
more anxious children as more credible witnesses. 102
The study found that the courts used few innovative procedures.
Only one child testified over closed-circuit television; none testified on
videotape. °3 The researchers attributed the failure to use these innova-
94. Id. at 47-48.
95. Id. at 57.
96. Id. at 58.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 71.
100. Id. at 68.
101. Id. at 90.
102. Id. at 91.
103. Id. at 80.
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tions to several factors including doubts about the constitutionality of
such procedures, concern for meeting the requisite showing of neces-
sity in order to use any particular procedure, and concern that use of
the procedures would reduce the judge's or jury's sympathy for the
child." 4 The researchers did not study how attorneys prepared chil-
dren for giving testimony, but they reported their impression that at-
torneys only infrequently made systematic attempts at such
preparation. 105
Goodman's study reveals that some children who testify exhibit
poor behavior adjustment when compared to other children who tes-
tify and to nontestifiers. The behavior of the nontestifiers and some
testifiers tended to improve over the time period studied, although to
a lesser extent for the latter. Number of times of testifying, maternal
support, and corroborative evidence were predictors of improved be-
havior in the subgroup of testifiers. Unfortunately, the study found
that the best witnesses, the ones the prosecution has the least reserva-
tion about calling because they possess the most credibility, are also
the ones with the most trauma in other areas of their lives. The high
level of stress in several areas of their lives makes them least able to
withstand the negative effects of multiple court appearances. Given
the attractiveness of these children as witnesses, the prosecution may
not be able to resist calling them despite the potential adverse conse-
quences to such children. Moreover, prosecutors may prefer not to
use innovative techniques such as videotaped testimony or closed-cir-
cuit television, because such techniques may engender less sympathy
in the judge or the jury.
While not a part of her study, Goodman reported that systematic
attempts at preparing children to give testimony were infrequent. Per-
haps greater emphasis on familiarizing the child with the courtroom
situation would allow the prosecution to take advantage of the child's
credibility as a witness, while avoiding the negative effects to the child
of multiple appearances.
The study found that generally, children who testified were appre-
hensive about testifying in the presence of the defendant. The children
who this prospect upset most had the most difficulty in answering the
prosecutor's questions. Those who felt most threatened by the defen-
dant appeared the most anxious on the stand; however, the heightened
appearance of anxiety tended to increase their credibility. One could
argue that the reported apprehension about testifying in the presence
of the defendant is not unique to children. The elderly, the handi-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 110.
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capped, and any other victim of a crime against his or her person are
likely to have similar reactions.
Given the potential disincentive that Goodman's study revealed for
prosecutors to use techniques such as videotaped testimony or closed-
circuit television and the availability of reforms with equal or greater
potential for effectiveness, state laws providing special procedures for
the protection of child witnesses at trial may have missed their mark.
Improvements in investigative techniques and pretrial procedures,
such as familiarizing children with the courtroom scenario, may be
more valuable in reducing trauma to the child victim. Such techniques
and procedures may make it possible for the child to testify in person
at the trial, to the advantage of the prosecution. These same innova-
tions may reduce the negative effects of testifying to a comparable, or
greater, extent than videotaped testimony or closed-circuit television.
Another advantage of such improvements is that attorneys can imple-
ment them without legislative action.
Recently, the federal government has shifted its emphasis and be-
gun to fund projects to assess the impact of state laws providing spe-
cial protection to child victims of sexual abuse. The government has
funded projects to study how the special protections available at trial
affect the child victim and the case outcome, to conduct a national
survey of prosecution practices, and to examine and compare the out-
come of the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases in nine jurisdic-
tions.'06 Because these projects only recently have received funding,
the results will not be available for some time. Thus, empirical data
presently do not exist on how often the courts use legislatively enacted
protections for child victims, their effect on the case outcome, or their
usefulness in shielding the child victim from trauma.
III. EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORUTY
A. Statutes and Rules
1. Florida Statutes
Florida was in the forefront of the movement to enact legislation
providing special protection to child victim witnesses. The Legislature
106. Telephone interview with Gail Goodman, SUNY-Buffalo (Oct. 30, 1989)(notes available
at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Talla-
hassee, Fla.); Telephone interview with Bob Horowitz, National Legal Resource Center for
Child Advocacy and Protection (Oct. 25, 1989)(notes available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of
Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.); Telephone interview
with Ellen Gray, Center for the Child, National Council of Jewish Women (Oct. 27, 1989)(notes
available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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has enacted laws providing for the taking of testimony on videotape
and via closed-circuit television. It also has enacted a separate hearsay
exception for the out-of-court statements of a child victim of sexual
abuse.
In 1979, the Legislature provided for the admission of videotaped
testimony of a child victim of sexual battery or child abuse who was
eleven years of age or younger. 107 Before using this procedure, the
provision required the court to find that the child would suffer severe
emotional or mental strain from testifying in open court.'n 8
In 1984, the Legislature expanded the videotape statute. The new
statute made the procedure applicable to witnesses other than the vic-
tim who are under the age of sixteen. 1°9 Under certain conditions, a
judge no longer had to preside at the videotaping."10 Lawmakers
added a provision requiring the defendant and defense counsel to be
present at the videotaping, unless the defendant waived such right."'
In 1985, lawmakers enacted comprehensive legislation that provided
several new protections for child victims and witnesses and enhanced
the existing protections." 2 This legislation made several important
changes to the videotape statute.
The new law lowered the standard of proof that the proponent must
show to obtain an order for the videotaping of testimony. Proponents
no longer had to show severe emotional or mental distress, rather they
need only show that the child would suffer at least moderate emo-
tional or mental harm, or is otherwise unavailable as defined in the
evidence code." 3 A new provision permitted either party to request an
interpreter to aid in formulating methods of questioning the child and
in interpreting the child's answers.' 14
The Legislature made two other changes to the videotape statute in
1985. First, the statute retained the requirement that the defendant
and counsel be present at the videotaping, but gave the court discre-
107. Ch. 79-69, 1979 Fla. Laws 386 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1979)).
108. Id. § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws at 386 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1979)); id. § 2, 1979 Fla.
Laws at 387 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1979)).
109. Ch. 84-36, 1984 Fla. Laws 79 (amending FA. STAT. § 918.17 (1983)).
110. Id. §1, 1984 Fla. Laws at 80 (amending FLA. STAT. § 918.17(3) (1983)).
111. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 918.17(4) (1983)).
112. Ch. 85-53, § 2, 1985 Fla. Laws 140, 141 (amending FLA. STAT. § 90.606 (1983)); id. § 3,
1985 Fla. Laws at 141 (amending FA. STAT. § 90.605 (1983)); id. § 4, 1985 Fla. Laws at 141
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803 (1985)); id. § 5, 1985 Fla. Laws at 142 (amending FLA. STAT. §
90.90 (Supp. 1984)); id. § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws at 143 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (1985)); id. §
7, 1985 Fla. Laws at 144 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 92.55 (1985)); id. § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws at 145
(amending FLA. STAT. § 119.011(3) (1983)); id. § 9, 1985 Fla. Laws at 146 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 92.53 (1985)).
113. Id. § 5, 1985 Fla Laws at 142 (amending FLA. STAT. § 90.90(1) (Supp. 1984)).
114. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 90.90(5) (Supp. 1984)).
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tion to require the defendant to view the testimony outside the pres-
ence of the child."' The defendant could view the testimony "by
means of a two-way mirror or another similar method that will ensure
that the defendant can observe and hear the testimony of the child in
person, but that the child cannot hear or see the defendant.""16 Sec-
ond, before taking any of the steps available pursuant to the law, the
court must make specific findings of fact on the record."17 The video-
tape statute has had no substantive amendments since 1985.
The 1985 legislation also created two new protections for children.
One provided for the taking of testimony via closed-circuit televi-
sion. 18 The other provided a new exception to the rule against hearsay
for the statement of a child victim of sexual abuse. " 9 The closed-cir-
cuit television provision has received no substantive amendments since
its enactment. The only amendment to the hearsay exception is a clari-
fication with respect to the cases in which it is applicable. 20
The closed-circuit television provision is similar to the videotape
statute. However, there are important differences. Both procedures
are available to a victim or other witness under the age of sixteen.' 2'
The law requires the same relaxed showing to use either procedure.
Proponents must show that there is a substantial likelihood that the
child will suffer at least moderate emotional or mental harm from tes-
tifying in open court or that the child is otherwise unavailable. 22 The
court must make specific findings of fact on the record as a basis for
its ruling. 23
The closed-circuit television provision differs from the videotape
provision in the cases to which they are applicable. The closed-circuit
television procedure is applicable only in cases involving a sexual of-
fense. 24 The videotape procedure is applicable in either a sexual abuse
case or a child abuse case. 25
Under the closed-circuit television procedure, only certain persons
may be in the room with the child during the taking of testimony.
These include the judge, the prosecutor, the defendant, the defen-
dant's attorney, the equipment operators, an interpreter, and a person
115. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 90.90(4) (Supp. 1984)).
116. Id.
117. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 90.90(7) (Supp. 1984)).
118. Id. § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws at 143 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (1985)).
119. Id. § 4, 1985 Fla, Laws at 141 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1985)).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 139-42.
121. See FLA. STAT. §§ 92.53(l), .54(1) (1989).
122. Id.
123. Id. §§ 92.53(7), .54(5).
124. Id. § 92.54(1).
125. Id. § 92.53(l).
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who the court has determined will contribute to the well-being of the
child. 1' During the taking of the child's testimony, the court can re-
quire the defendant to view the testimony from the courtroom . 27 If
the court so requires, it must permit the defendant to see and hear the
child's testimony, but it also must ensure that the child cannot hear or
see the defendant. 128
The hearsay exception protects the statement of a child victim of
sexual abuse or a sexual offense. The exception is effective even
though the declarant is available.' 29 The exception applies only to the
statement of a child victim who is less than twelve years of age physi-
cally, mentally, emotionally, or developmentally.'30 It protects the
child's statements "describing any act of child abuse, sexual abuse, or
any other offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion,
or penetration performed in the presence of, with, by, or on the de-
clarant child.' 3'
The statement must meet two prerequisites before a court can admit
it into evidence. First, the court must conduct a hearing to determine
whether the circumstances surrounding the statement provide suffi-
cient safeguards of reliability. 32 In making its determination, the
court may consider a number of factors including the following: the
age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or
offense, the relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of
the assertion, and the reliability of the child victim. 33
The second prerequisite for the admission of the child's statement is
that the child must either testify or be unavailable as a witness. 34 To
admit the statement because the child is unavailable, other corrobora-
tive evidence of the abuse or offense must exist.135 A child victim wit-
ness is unavailable if the court finds that the child's participation in
the trial would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or
mental harm. 36 Thus, the hearsay statement must meet a stricter stan-
dard for admission than videotaped or closed-circuit televised testi-
mony.
126. Id. § 92.54(3).
127. Id. § 92.54(4).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 90.803(23).
130. Id. § 90.803(23)(a).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 90.803(23)(a)(1).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 90.803(23)(a)(2).
135. Id. § 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b).
136. Id.
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In a criminal action, the defendant must receive notice at least ten
days before trial that the prosecution will offer a hearsay statement in
evidence pursuant to the provision. 37 The court must make specific
findings of fact on the record as to the basis for its ruling. 3,
The evidentiary special protections are available for use in certain
criminal or civil cases. In response to the First District Court of Ap-
peal's decision in Childress v. State,13 9 the Florida Legislature at its
1990 Regular Session clarified the cases to which the hearsay excep-
tion applies.
Under the old law, the hearsay exception was applicable to a child's
statement describing "any act of child abuse, sexual abuse, or any
other offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or
penetration performed in the presence of, with, by, or on the declar-
ant child. . . ."140 Based upon language in the preamble to the session
law which created the exception, the First District Court of Appeal
held that the exception applies only to a sexual child abuse case, and
not to a non-sexual child abuse case.' 41
As amended, the exception now applies to a child's statement de-
scribing "any act of child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual abuse
against a child, the bffense of child abuse, the offense of aggravated
child abuse, or any offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact,
intrusion, or penetration performed in the presence of, with, by, or on
the declarant child .... ",142 Thus, the exception is available in civil
and criminal cases involving sexual or non-sexual abuse of a child.
The videotape and closed-circuit television protections are not avail-
able in the same cases. A child's testimony "in a sexual abuse case or
child abuse case, whether civil or criminal in nature," can be video-
taped for use at trial in lieu of testimony in open court . 43 Testimony
of a child victim of or witness to "an unlawful sexual act, contact,
intrusion, penetration, or other sexual offense [may] be taken outside
of the courtroom and shown by means of closed circuit television."'"
The language of the videotape procedure explicitly provides that the
procedure is available in both sexual abuse and child abuse cases,
whether civil or criminal in nature. Thus, this provision applies to a
137. Id. § 90.803(23)(b).
138. Id. § 90.803(c).
139. 543 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
140. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1989).
141. Childress, 543 So. 2d at 415.
142. Ch. 90-174, § 3, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 583, 583 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. §
90.803(23) (1989)).
143. FLA. STAT. § 92.53(1) (1989).
144. Id. § 92.54(1).
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case involving a sexual offense with or to a child or in a non-sexual
child abuse case.
The language of the closed-circuit television procedure refers only
to sexual offenses involving children. No reference is made to child
abuse. Thus, this provision is applicable only in cases involving sexual
offenses.
The three evidentiary special protections noted above, recording tes-
timony on videotape, taking testimony via closed-circuit television,
and the special hearsay exception, apply only to children under certain
ages. They do not apply to the elderly or to disabled adults. In this
regard, Florida is consistent with the majority of states. Only five
states which make special protections available to children also make
them available to others.14 Three of the five states have laws specifi-
cally extending one or more of the evidentiary special protections to
disabled adults.1 No statute extends a specific special evidentiary
protection to the elderly.
2. Other Jurisdictions
The federal rules of evidence do not provide a specific hearsay ex-
ception for the out-of-court statements of a child victim or witness.
The federal rules do provide a residual exception within the list of
exceptions applicable when the availability of the declarant is immate-
rial.147 Under this exception, the federal courts have admitted the out-
of-court statements of a child victim of sex related crimes. 4 Neither
the federal rules nor the federal statutes provide for the use of video-
taped or closed-circuit televised testimony of a child victim at trial.
In 1986, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted a uniform rule of evidence to provide special pro-
tection to children. 49 The uniform rule includes hearsay, videotape,
and closed-circuit television protections.15 0 The rule makes the protec-
tions applicable to the statements or testimony of a child who is a
victim of, or witness to, acts of "sexual conduct" or "physical vio-
lence." 151 The rule suggests making these protections available to a
minor under the age of twelve. 52
145. See infra text accompanying notes 310-31.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 310-320.
147. FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
148. See, e.q., United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987) (and cases cited therein), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988);
United States v. Frazier, 678 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 806 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1986).
149. UNH. R. Evm. 807, 13A U.L.A. (1986) (rule added 1986).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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No state has adopted the uniform rule as written. A majority of
states, however, either have promulgated rules of evidence or enacted
statutes that parallel some parts of it. At least thirty states provide a
hearsay exception for the out-of-court statements of children in cer-
tain criminal or civil cases.'53 Thirty-seven states have a provision for
admission of the videotaped testimony of a child at hearing or trial in
certain cases. 54 Finally, thirty-one states provide for the taking of a
child's testimony over closed-circuit television in certain cases. '55
B. Case Law
1. United States Supreme Court
(a) Coy v. Iowa
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides an
accused the right to confront witnesses. Specifically, the sixth amend-
ment provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him
.... " 156 A similar provision is found in the Florida Constitution.'17
In Coy v. Iowa,5 8 the United States Supreme Court decided that an
Iowa statute providing special protection at trial to child victims vio-
lated the defendant's right to confrontation. In holding the statute un-
constitutional by a six to two vote, the Court left open the question of
what, if any, special protections it would uphold as constitutional.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under a 1985 Iowa statute intended to protect child victims of sex-
ual abuse, the state moved to allow the complaining witnesses, two 13-
year old girls, to testify either via closed-circuit television or from be-
hind a screen.' 59 The trial court approved the placement of a large
screen between the defendant and the witness stand during the vic-
153. See G. JOSEPH, S. SALTZBURG, & TIRIA EvTD. Comm. OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF
LITGATION, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RuLEs IN THE STATES ch. 61A at 2 (1988); State
v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 691-92 & nn. 3-4, 760 P.2d 27, 30-31 & nn.3-4 (1988) (The trial court
admitted certain of child's hearsay statements under Idaho Code § 10-3024 and IDAHO R. EVD.
803(24). The latter is similar to the federal residual hearsay exception. Admission of statements
was upheld, in part, on basis of the residual exception.); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (1989
Supp.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. 1988 Supp.); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2
(1989 Supp.).
154. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167 n.2 (1990).
155. Id. at 3167-68 & nn.3-4. -
156. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
157. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(a).
158. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
159. Id. at 1014.
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tims' testimony.6 After adjustments to the lighting in the courtroom,
the screen would allow the defendant dimly to perceive the witnesses,
but it would block them from seeing the defendant. 6' The Court held
that this procedure violated the defendant's right to confront the com-
plaining witnesses.
The Court stated that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the de-
fendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the
trier of fact.' ' 62 The Court, noting the plain language of the clause,
the Latin origin of the word "confront," Shakespeare's descriptive
portrayal of the root meaning of confrontation in one of his plays,
and case law, meant face-to-face meeting in the literal sense. 6 Al-
though it acknowledged a trial court may not compel the witness to
gaze upon the defendant, the Court could not ignore the profound
effect on the witness of standing in the presence of the person the
witness has accused.164
Considering the facts of the case before it, the Court found that the
use of a screen blocking the witnesses' view of the defendant as each
testified violated the defendant's right to a face-to-face meeting. 6
The Court rejected the state's suggestion that the necessity of protect-
ing victims of sexual abuse outweighed the right of confrontation.'6
While noting it has held that certain rights the confrontation clause
confers are not absolute and may give way to other important inter-
ests, the Court found such rights are
not the right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the Clause, but
rather rights that are, or were asserted to be, reasonably implicit-
namely, the right to cross-examine, the right to exclude out-of-court
statements, and the asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at
some point in the proceedings other than the trial itself. 67
The Court carefully distinguished those cases where implicit rights un-
der the confrontation clause must take into account other important
interests from its holding in the instant case that there are identifiable
exceptions, in light of other important interests, to the literal meaning
of the clause.'6 For the majority, the literal meaning of the clause was
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1014-1015.
162. Id. at 1015-16.
163. Id. at 1016-19 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 1019.
165. Id. at 1020-22.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1020 (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 1020-21 (citation omitted).
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that a defendant has a right to meet face-to-face witnesses who give
evidence at trial.
The Court left for another day the question of whether there exist
any exceptions to this right.' 69 The Court noted, however, that what-
ever those exceptions may be, the Court would only allow them when
necessary to further an important public policy. 70 Further, when the
exception was not one firmly rooted in jurisprudence, the Court
would require a particularized finding of necessity.' 71 The novelty of
the Iowa statute's exception indicated that it was not so firmly rooted,
and the lack of individualized findings that the victim witnesses
needed special protection precluded a holding, under any conceivable
exception to the literal right of confrontation, that the trial court had
not violated defendant's right thereto. 72
In a concurring opinion, joined by Justice White, Justice O'Connor
stressed her view that nothing in the Court's opinion necessarily
doomed efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses. She
noted that the Iowa provision authorizing the use of a screen was
unique. 7 3 She went on to note that a number of states have authorized
the use of one- or two-way closed-circuit television or videotaped testi-
mony, or both. 74 Many of these procedures "may raise no substantial
Confrontation Clause problem since they involve testimony in the
presence of the defendant."' 15 As examples of the meaning of testi-
mony in the presence of the defendant, Justice O'Connor cited two-
statutes providing for one-way closed-circuit television which require
the defendant's presence in the same room as the witness, and two
statutes providing for two-way closed-circuit television which require
that the defendant's image be visible to the witness. 176
Justice O'Connor rejected any suggestion in the majority opinion
that a defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation with her or his
accusers was absolute. She noted that the Court has stated that the
right reflects a preference for a face-to-face meeting, but at the same
time, it has expressly recognized that competing interests can over-
come the preference if warranted. 77 "That a particular procedure im-
pacts the 'irreducible literal meaning of the Clause' . does not alter
169. Id. at 1021.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citations omitted).
176. Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 1025.
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this conclusion."' 8 Thus, Justice O'Connor would recognize excep-
tions to the right to a face-to-face meeting if the procedure was neces-
sary to further an important public policy.179
In her view and, she noted, in the view of a majority of state legisla-
tures, the protection of child witnesses is an important public pol-
icy.8 0 Given the expression of this policy, the Justice noted that the
reviewing court likely will focus primarily on whether the finding of
necessity for use of the procedure is adequate."' Only a case-specific
finding of necessity will be adequate.8 2
Like the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence left cer-
tain questions unanswered. She did not go so far as to say that state
statutes requiring the defendant to be out of sight and hearing of the
child witness did not raise confrontation problems. The state statutes
she offered as not raising substantial problems under the clause were
those which required that the defendant be in the same room as the
witness or that the defendant's image be visible to the witness.
After the Coy decision, a number of state courts decided cases in-
volving the respective state's statutes providing special means for tak-
ing the testimony of children. Some of the decisions dealt directly with
the question the majority opinion in Coy left open, i.e., whether any
exceptions exist to the literal right to confront one's accusers at trial.
Within this subset of cases, there were varying results.183
(b) Maryland v. Craig
In its recent five to four decision in Maryland v. Craig,'84 the Su-
preme Court answered the question it left open in Coy. Justice
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion which reflects the reasoning of
her concurring opinion in Coy.
In Craig, the question before the Court was the constitutionality of
Maryland's one-way closed-circuit television procedure. The statutory
procedure permits a trial judge to receive by one-way closed-circuit
television the testimony of a child witness who is the alleged victim of
child abuse.8 5 Before the court can use the procedure, the judge must
178. Id. (quoting the majority opinion, 487 U.S. at 1021).
179. Id. at 1025.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Compare Bonello v. State, 210 Conn. 51, 554 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2103
(1989) and Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated, Maryland v. Craig, 110
S. Ct. 3157 (1990) with State v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988) and Com-
monwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988).
184. 1IOS. Ct. 3157 (1990).
185. Id. at 3160-61 (citation omitted).
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first "determin[e] that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom
will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that
the child cannot reasonably communicate." 8 6 Once the court invokes
the procedure, examination and cross-examination occur in a separate
room, while a video monitor records and displays the child's testi-
mony to the defendant in the courtroom. 18 7 During this time, the child
cannot see the defendant.188
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found the confrontation clause
does not require a face-to-face confrontation between the defendant
and the defendant's accusers in all cases, but the court concluded that
under the state statute, the emotional distress rendering the child una-
ble to communicate must arise primarily from face-to-face confronta-
tion with the defendant. 18 9 The state court further concluded that
unless prevention of face-to-face confrontation is necessary to obtain
the child's trial testimony, the court cannot deny the defendant that
right. 19 The Maryland court held that the state's showing was insuffi-
cient to reach the high threshold that Coy required before invoking
the statutory procedure.' 91
The Court, through Justice O'Connor, acknowledged its observa-
tions in Coy that the confrontation clause guarantees the defendant a
face-to-face meeting with his or her accusers and that the Court de-
rives this interpretation from the literal text of the clause and its his-
torical roots. 92 The Court noted, however, that it has never held that
the confrontation clause guarantees a criminal defendant the absolute
right to a face-to-face meeting at trial with adverse witnesses. 93 Thus,
the Court reaffirmed the importance of face-to-face confrontation,
but found, given its precedents regarding hearsay, that such confron-
tation was not an indispensable element of the sixth amendment's
guarantee of confrontation.194 In conjunction with this finding, the
Court, reiterating its suggestion in Coy, made clear that a court can
dispense with physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only when
its denial is necessary to further an important public policy and the
court has otherwise assured the reliability of the testimony. 195
186. Id. at 3161 (quoting MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii)(1989)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 3162 (citation omitted).
190. Id. (citation omitted).
191. Id. (citation omitted).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 3163.
194. Id. at 3164-65.
195. Id. at 3166.
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Applying these legal principles, the Court ultimately held that
if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest
in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child
abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special
procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial
against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with
the defendant.'9
The Court reasoned that with the exception of providing a face-to-
face meeting between defendant and witness, Maryland's statutory
procedure preserved all of the other elements of the confrontation
right-oath, cross-examination, and observation of the witness's de-
meanor. Therefore, the Court deemed the procedure the functional
equivalent of live, in-person testimony.' 97 Thus, the procedure did
"not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes" of the
clause. 198
Having reached the conclusion that the procedure did not impinge
on the right of confrontation, the central question for the Court was
whether the use of the procedure was necessary to further an impor-
tant state interest.199 The Court concluded that the state does have an
interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse vic-
tims and that interest may be sufficiently important to outweigh a de-
fendant's right to face-to-face confrontation.N In support of this
conclusion, the Court cited several cases in which this interest out-
weighed other rights. 203
In further support of its conclusion, the Court noted that a major-
ity of states had enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the
trauma of giving testimony, thereby manifesting a widespread belief
in the importance of such a public policy. 20 The Court also noted that
the impetus for the enactment of Maryland's procedure was a gover-
nor's task force report documenting an increase in investigations of
child abuse.203 The report's proposed legislation eventually became the
Maryland statute. According to the report, the proposed legislation's
aim was to alleviate a child victim's trauma from testifying in open
court. 204
196. Id. at 3169.
197. Id. at 3166-67.
198. Id. at 3167.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 3167-68.
203. Id. at 3168 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 518, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (1987).
204. Id. (quoting Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 517, 530 A.2d at 285).
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Finally, the Court cited a portion of the Brief for the American
Psychological Association (APA) as Amicus Curiae and the Goodman
study as part of a "growing body of academic literature documenting
the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must
testify in court. ' 205 The APA, in that portion of its brief cited by the
Court, argued that child victims may be more likely than adult victims
to suffer substantial trauma as a result of testifying in the physical
presence of the defendant. 2°6 While acknowledging that adults too
may suffer distress from legal involvement, the argument was that the
development of adults is more complete, therefore the impact of such
involvement may be less significant for adults than for children. 207 For
the Court, this body of literature buttressed the state's interest in pro-
tecting the welfare of children. 2°s
The Court set out the standards for the case-specific finding of ne-
cessity which a court must make in order for the state's interest in
protecting children to outweigh a defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation. Essentially, a trial court must determine from the evi-
dence that the prospect of testifying in the physical presence of the
defendant would traumatize the particular child witness who seeks to
testify beyond simply nervousness or excitement or reluctance to do
so.2 9 Merely protecting the child from courtroom trauma generally
would not justify denying the defendant's right of confrontation.2 10
However, the Court did not decide the minimum showing of emo-
205. Id. at 3168-69.
206. Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae at 7, Maryland v.
Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478) (emphasis added). For example, it was argued that the
period of life during which a child sexual assault victim is involved in legal proceedings repre-
sents a time of special stress. Id. (citing G. Goodman, supra note 79). To illustrate the point, the
APA stated that "[s]tressors in childhood can slow the course of normal cognitive and emotional
development such that stressed children do not advance at the same pace as their unstressed
peers." Id.
207. Id. at 8. Without comparative research, the APA's argument lacks validity. An individ-
ual continues to develop beyond childhood, and legal involvement can be equally disruptive, if
not more so, during this period of life. For example, adult victims's legal involvement as wit-
nesses in the prosecution of a sexual crimes against them can be so devastating emotionally as to
affect their career path, marital relationship, or both.
Ultimately, the APA argued that the effect on a child victim witness of confronting the defen-
dant face-to-face was dependent upon the personality of the particular child. Id. at 13. Similarly,
it can be argued that the effect of confrontation on an adult victim witness is dependent upon
the personality of the individual. Thus, for both child and adult victim witnesses, determining
whether face-to-face confrontation with the defendant would have a negative impact so severe
that it justifies invoking a special procedure involves predicting how a particular individual
would react to such confrontation. For a discussion of the APA's views on the profession's
ability to make such predictions, see infra notes 360-62 and accompanying text.
208. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct at 3168.
209. Id. at 3169.
210. Id.
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tional trauma required for use of a special procedure. Rather, the
Court simply stated that the Maryland statute, which requires a deter-
mination that the child witness will suffer serious emotional distress
rendering the child unable to reasonably communicate, met constitu-
tional standards.
Based upon all of the foregoing findings, the Court acknowledged
the correctness of the Maryland Court of Appeals' holdings that face-
to-face confrontation is not an absolute constitutional requirement
and that a court can abridge such right when there is a case-specific
finding that the child would suffer serious emotional distress if re-
quired to testify in court in the presence of the defendant.211
However, the Court found that Maryland's tribunal had gone too
far in imposing two subsidiary requirements, and for that reason va-
cated the lower court's judgment. Specifically, the Court rejected the
requirement that the proponent must question the child witness in the
defendant's presence in front of the trial judge before the court can
invoke the statutory procedure.2 12 The Court also rejected the state
court's requirement that the court can use one-way closed-circuit tele-
vision only after the trial judge has determined that two-way closed-
circuit television will not protect the child sufficiently.2 1 3 Thus, the
Court declined "to establish,,as a matter of federal constitutional law,
any such categorical evidentiary prerequisites for the use of the one-
way television procedure." 214
The Court opined that based on the expert testimony placed into
evidence the trial court could well have found that requiring the child
witnesses to testify in court in the presence of the defendant would
result in serious emotional distress to them such that they could not
reasonably communicate. 2"5 That testimony consisted of the follow-
ing:
As to one child, the expert said that what "would cause him the most
anxiety would be to testify in front of Mrs. Craig. .. ." The child
"wouldn't be able to communicate effectively." As to another, an
expert said she would probably stop talking and she would withdraw
and curl up. With respect to two others, the testimony was that one
would "become highly agitated, that he may refuse to talk or if he
did talk, that he would choose his subject regardless of the
211. Id. at 3170.
212. Id. at 3170-71.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 3171.
215. Id.
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questions," while the other would "become extremely timid and
unwilling to talk. 21 6
Given the Court's opinion on this point, it will be difficult for the
Maryland Court of Appeals to uphold its reversal of the trial court's
ruling permitting the use of the one-way closed circuit television pro-
cedure.
2. Florida Cases
The Florida Constitution contains its own confrontation clause. It
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . shall
have the right ... to confront at trial adverse witnesses ....
At about the same time as the decision in Coy v. Iowa, the Florida
Supreme Court decided two cases involving the constitutionality, un-
der the federal and state confrontation clauses, of Florida's statutes
providing special protection to child witnesses. In opinions issued si-
multaneously, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, which provides for the admis-
sion of hearsay statements of children regarding sexual abuse. In one
of the cases, the court also found that the introduction at trial of a
child victim's videotaped testimony under section 92.53, Florida Sta-
tutes, did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation.
In Perez v. State,2 8 the court rejected defendant's contention that
section 90.803(23) was unconstitutional on its face. The state sought
to introduce at trial the hearsay statements of an alleged child victim
of sexual offenses to his mother and two police officers. 2 9 The trial
court found reliable, after an evidentiary hearing, the child victim's
out-of-court statements. The trial court also found that the child was
unavailable to testify, due to a substantial likelihood the child would
suffer severe emotional or mental harm from testifying. 220 The defen-
dant entered a plea of nolo contendre and appealed the trial court's
ruling. The district court of appeals affirmed. 22'
In his appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the defendant con-
tended that section 90.803(23) violated the right of confrontation un-
der the United States and Florida Constitutions. The court rejected his
contention.
216. Id. at 3161 (quoting Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 568-69, 560 A.2d 1120, 1128-29
(1989)).
217. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(a).
218. 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3253 (1989).
219. Id. at 207.
220. Id. at 207-08.
221. Id. at 208.
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The court found two elements must exist to reconcile hearsay excep-
tions with the confrontation clause. First, because the clause prefers a
face-to-face meeting, some necessity must be shown to justify the wit-
ness' failure to give live testimony, i.e., the witness must be shown to
be unavailable.m Second, once a party shows unavailability, the court
will admit hearsay only if the hearsay is reliable. 2a3 The law infers the
reliability of a hearsay statement if it falls within a firmly rooted hear-
say exception; but if the statement does not, the offering party must
show the reliability of the statement with particularity.2
The court found that section 90.803(23) followed the general ap-
proach that the United States Supreme Court established and, there-
fore, met the requirements of the confrontation clauses in the federal
and state constitutions. Initially, the statute recognizes that the hear-
say exception for statements of a child victim is not a firmly rooted
exception. 225 To overcome this condition and admit the statement of a
child, the statute requires the court find that the "time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of relia-
bility. "226 If the child does not testify, the court must determine that
she or he is unavailable, and that other corroborative evidence of the
abuse or offense exists. 227 Thus, there is a particularized guarantee of
the trustworthiness of the statement. 228
The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutional as
applied. A reviewing court will uphold the trial judge's finding regard-
ing the likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm to the child
from testifying at trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion. 229 Ab-
sent such a showing, a court will also uphold the trial judge's determi-
nation that the out-of-court statements are sufficiently reliable. 230
The trial judge made specific findings of fact on the record that
there was a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm
to the child if the court required him to testify at trial.231 A mental
health worker and the child's mother testified of such probable ef-
fects. 232 Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in finding that testify-
ing would harm the child.
222. Id. (citation omitted).
223. Id. (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 209 (citation omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id. (citation omitted).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 210.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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The trial court's determination that the child was unavailable trig-
gered the statute's requirement for other corroborative evidence of
abuse. The court found the defendant's admission of the offense to a
police officer to be sufficient corroborative evidence of the offense. 233
Again, this determination was not an abuse of discretion. 234
The Florida Supreme Court released its opinion in Glendening v.
Stat&5 simultaneously with the Perez decision. Among other things,
defendant Glendening raised as issues the constitutionality of section
90.803(23), and the constitutionality of section 92.53, the videotape
statute. The court disposed of the first issue by reference to its opin-
ion in Perez.236
With respect to section 92.53, Glendening contended that the intro-
duction at trial of the child victim's videotaped testimony violated his
right of confrontation. The trial court granted the state's motion to
videotape the child's testimony upon finding, pursuant to section
92.53, a substantial likelihood the child would suffer at least moderate
emotional or mental harm from testifying in open court. 237 The trial
court required Glendening to view the child's testimony from behind a
two-way mirror during videotaping. 238 Thus, the court required him to
view the testimony outside the child's presence. 239 It is unclear from
the supreme court's opinion whether the child could see the defendant
or if the child knew the defendant could observe her.
Defendant further argued that the requirements of sections 92.53
and 90.803(23) are independent and that the requirements of each
must be met. The trial court had made no finding regarding unavaila-
bility under section 90.803(23).2 40
The opinion of the district court of appeal most clearly articulated
the defendant's contention with respect to the necessity for independ-
ent findings. That court and the supreme court rejected this conten-
tion. For two reasons, the district court found that the trial court
could not substitute its hearing on the state's motion to videotape the
child's testimony for a hearing on unavailability under section
90.803(23). First, the trial court conducted the former hearing for a
different purpose, and second, the standard for permitting videotaped
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3219 (1989).
236. Id. at 214.
237. Id. at 216.
238. Id. at 217.
239. Id. at 216.
240. Glendening v. State, 503 So. 2d 335, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), aff'd, 536 So. 2d 212
(Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3219 (1989).
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testimony is different. 241 A court may allow videotaped testimony if
there is a substantial likelihood the child will suffer at least moderate
emotional or mental harm, whereas admission of a child's hearsay
statement under section 90.803(23) requires a finding of substantial
likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm.242
Notwithstanding, the district court found it unnecessary for the trial
court to make a finding of unavailability under section 90.803(23).
The court held that for purposes of that section, the child's video-
taped testimony was equivalent to her having testified in person. 243
The trial court took the child's testimony with full participation by
counsel for each side, and defendant had the opportunity to cross-
examine the child. 2"
The supreme court approved the district court's decision. The su-
preme court held that "[a]pplication of section 92.53 to permit video-
taping the child's testimony instead of requiring the child to testify in
open court for purposes of admitting the child's out-of-court state-
ments pursuant to section 90.803(23) does not violate the federal or
Florida constitutional guarantee of the right of confrontation." 241 De-
fendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the child, and the jury
could view the child's demeanor as she testified. 2" Thus, the court
expressed the view that the child's videotaped testimony was the func-
tional equivalent of live testimony at trial.
The fact that Glendening viewed the child's testimony from behind
a two-way mirror did not alter the supreme court's conclusion. 247 The
parties made arrangements so that there was no interference with his
opportunity to cross-examine the child." As noted above, however, it
is unclear from the court's opinion whether the child could see the
defendant or whether the child had any knowledge that the defendant
could observe her.
The court found that the defendant's right of confrontation must
yield to the "state's interest in sparing child victims the further
trauma of in-court testimony.''29 The court refused to alter this con-
clusion even after considering Coy v. Iowa.20
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 217 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3219
(1989).
246. Id. (citations omitted).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting Chambers v. State, 504 So. 2d 476, 477-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)).
250. Id. (discussing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)). The Supreme Court issued the Coy
opinion after oral arguments in Glendening.
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The court gave two reasons why Coy would not alter its conclusion.
First, the court distinguished the Coy decision by noting that the Su-
preme Court rejected Iowa's argument that its statute established a
necessity for an exception. The Iowa statute created a legislatively im-
posed presumption of trauma. The Court found such an exception
was not firmly rooted. Therefore, the exception could not stand, be-
cause it did not require particularized findings that the witnesses
needed special protection.25'
The court contrasted the statute at issue in Coy with section 92.53,
Florida Statutes. The latter requires an individualized determination
that the use of videotaped testimony is necessary to prevent emotional
or mental harm to the child. The trial court permitted the videotaping
of the child's testimony after holding a hearing at which it took testi-
mony on the issue of harm to the child from the child's mother, a
guardian ad litem, a doctor, and a social worker. 2 2 Thus, unlike the
situation in Coy, there was a case-specific finding of necessity. 253
Second, the court noted that the majority in Coy would permit the
application of harmless error analysis to the denial of face-to-face
confrontation. 2 4 The court concluded that if it was error to deny face-
to-face confrontation to Glendening, such error was harmless. 255 The
child's videotaped testimony did not implicate the defendant, but in
fact, was exculpatory. Defense counsel did not cross-examine the
child, and the defense used the tape as part of its case.256
Since the defense did not raise Coy's literal interpretation of the
confrontation clause as an issue, the court did not address it. Never-
theless, the court did say that the fact that the defendant was outside
the "presence" of the child behind a two-way mirror during the vide-
otaping of the child's testimony did not change its conclusion. Thus,
the Florida Supreme Court did not address the issue that the majority
and Justice O'Connor left open in Coy, regarding the constitutionality
of a statute which prohibits a child witness from seeing the defendant
during the videotaping of the child's testimony. In Maryland v. Craig,
however, Justice O'Connor found such statutes did not violate the
right of confrontation under the federal constitution. In Florida, at
least one district court of appeal had so held even before the Craig
decision. 25 7
251. Id. at 218.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See Fricke v. Florida, 561 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
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At least one commentator shares the court's conclusion that video-
taped testimony is equivalent to testimony given at trial. 28 However,
one must consider other factors before equating videotaped testimony
with live testimony at trial. For example, the following issues affect
such an equivalency determination: whether the videotape fully con-
veys the witness' demeanor; whether other voices and images are on
the tape, and if so, whether the videotape is clear and identifies
them.2 9 Florida's videotape statute does not address technical quality
standards.
Notwithstanding district court of appeal and Florida Supreme
Court holdings that videotaped testimony which satisfies section 92.53
is equivalent to live testimony, and therefore, not a hearsay statement
under section 90.803(23), one cannot ignore the differences between
the two statutes. The appellate court pointed out that the threshold
for unavailability is different under each statute. 26 Under the video-
tape statute, a child witness is unavailable when the child will suffer at
least moderate emotional or mental harm; under the hearsay excep-
tion, the threshold is one of severe emotional or mental harm. 26' Pro-
fessor Graham has noted that these differing threshold requirements
for unavailability are "probably based on the mistaken and inappro-
priate notion that the confrontation clause requirement of unavailabil-
ity can vary depending on the trustworthiness of the testimony
"262 Irrespective of the procedure, he believed "a showing of a
substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm is required"
to establish unavailability. 263
In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court, while not deciding the
minimum showing of emotional trauma it requires for the use of a
special procedure, found that the requirement under Maryland's
closed-circuit television statute met constitutional standards. 264 To in-
voke Maryland's procedure, the offeror must show that if the child
witness testified in the presence of the defendant, the child would suf-
fer serious emotional distress rendering the child unable to reasonably
communicate. 265
258. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative In-
novations, 98 HARv. L. REv. 806, 822-24 (1985).
259. See id. at 823; Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 375-76 (Mass. 1988).
260. Glendening v. State, 503 So. 2d 335, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
261. Id.
262. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prose-
cutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MIN. L. REv. 523, 559-60 (1988).
263. Id.
264. I10 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
265. Id. at 3161 n.1.
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Despite the Perez and Glendening decisions, Florida's special proce-
dure statutes continue to generate legal controversy. In a number of
cases since those decisions, the issue was whether the trial court met
the statutory requirement for a case-specific finding of necessity on
the record. In most of the cases, the district courts of appeal have held
the findings inadequate. 266
In Leggett v. State, 267 the Florida Supreme Court gave some guid-
ance regarding the kind of findings that the statutes require. The court
issued the Leggett opinion shortly after the decision in Maryland v.
Craig.26 The Leggett trial court permitted the alleged victim of aggra-
vated child abuse to give videotape testimony rather than personally
appearing in court, pursuant to section 92.53. The court allowed the
defendant to view the child victim through a two-way mirror as the
child testified 269
There were two principal issues on appeal. The first issue was
whether the evidence was sufficient to admit the videotaped testi-
mony. The second was whether the trial judge followed the statutory
requirements in authorizing the procedure.2 70
With respect to the first issue, an experienced clinical social worker
was the only witness to testify. She had counseled the child weekly for
about a year. At trial, she testified as follows:
A. At this point in time having seen the child approximately
weekly, he is terrified of facing his uncle. When a child is alleging
266. See, e.q., Lacue v. State, 562 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (Error for trial court to
fail to make specific findings of fact on the record supporting admission of certain hearsay
statements pursuant to § 90.803(23). The trial court also failed to make such findings as to
reliability of statements.); Weatherford v. State, 561 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (The trial
court erred in admitting testimony of social worker, victim's mother, and investigator as to al-
leged child victim's statements. The trial court made no findings of fact on record, as required
by § 90.803(23), setting forth reasons it determined out-of-court statements to be reliable or
reasons it discounted any lack of reliability. On the stand, child had not identified defendant as
perpetrator, but all of child's hearsay statements implicated defendant.); Spoerri v. State, 561
So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (Prior to trial, State moved to allow alleged child victim to testify
via two-way closed-circuit television, but at trial state began the case by having child testify in
open court. State then sought to remove child from courtroom and have her continue to testify
via two-way closed-circuit television. The appellate court held that this sequence of events was
prejudicial to defendant. Further, the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings on the
record that child would suffer at least moderate emotional or mental harm before permitting the
child to testify via closed-circuit television.); but see, e.g., Woodfin v. Florida, 553 So. 2d 1355,
1356 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 563 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1990) (Requirements of § 90.803(23)
regarding specific findings of fact were substantially complied with, even though the findings
"were not very specific.").
267. 565 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1990).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 184-216.
269. Leggett, 565 So. 2d at 316.
270. Id.
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that they have been abused and they are a child victim, the most
terrifying thing and the most traumatic thing they ever have to do is
face their offender face to face. Eventually, I would hope that would
be possible, but at this point in time it would be damaging to him
emotionally to have to do that and I think it would make a behavior
change, it would put back his school work, academically, mentally.
It just would not be good at this point.
Q. Okay. And basically if you can tell us, on what do you base
those conclusions that it would be harmful for him to confront his
uncle at this time?
A. Basically on what the child tells me as well as his performance
in school, his behavior, emotionally, and his home placement.
Q. Okay. Is it your opinion, then, that to have him come into
open court and testify in the presence of his uncle would be harmful
to him mentally or emotionally.
A. Yes, it is my opinion.27 1
The court found that while the witness' testimony began with a
statement that it is damaging generally for a child abuse victim to tes-
tify in front of the accused, she did state specifically that it would be
harmful mentally for the child in the instant case to testify in the de-
fendant's presence. 272 The court further found that although the wit-
ness never spoke words tracking the language of section 92.53 that the
harm would be "at least moderate," she did state specific areas in
which the child would suffer.273 Given these statements, the court re-
fused to conclude that there was insufficient evidence for the trial
judge to determine that the child would suffer at least moderate emo-
tional or mental harm. 274 However, the court cautioned that "mere
discomfort or even fright, without more, does not meet the statutory
criterion.' '275
With respect to the second issue, the court noted that the trial
judge's only basis for permitting the procedure was his statement that
it would be in the best interest of everyone to have the child's testi-
mony videotaped. 276 The court held that such a statement failed to
comply with the statutory requirements: 277
271. Id. at 317 (emphasis in the original).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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There was no finding that there was a substantial likelihood that the
child would suffer at least moderate psychological or mental harm,
as required by subsection 92.53(1). Further, there was a failure to
comply with subsection 92.53(7) by making specific findings of fact
on the record with respect to the nature of the ruling.27
For the court, the failure to make such findings was more than a
technical error. Citing Maryland v. Craig,279 the court stated that
"[b]y requiring specific findings, the statute ensures that the judge has
made an individualized determination employing the proper stan-
dard.' 28° Given the trial judge's statement, there simply was no way
to tell whether he had employed the proper standard. Further, if the
supreme court relied solely on the sufficiency of the evidence for its
decision, it would be ignoring the plain language of the statute, and it
would be construing the statute in a manner that could render it un-
constitutional under Coy v. Iowa.28 1
While Craig and Leggett answer certain questions regarding Flori-
da's statutory special procedures, they also raise new issues. For ex-
ample, Craig does not clarify whether Florida's videotape and closed-
circuit television procedures meet constitutional standards, since un-
der each, the trial judge need only find that the child will suffer mod-
erate emotional or mental harm before invoking the procedure.
Further, under Craig and Leggett all that a court really needs to in-
voke one of the special procedures is the speculative, albeit educated,
prediction of an expert that testifying in the presence of the defendant
will harm the child to a certain degree. Presumably, for a defendant
to refute such a prediction and to retain his literal right of confronta-
tion, he must obtain his own expert to interview the child, and that
expert must make a stronger contrary prediction. While such repeated
interviewing in itself may be traumatic for the child, that may be nec-
essary to protect the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation.
Finally, there is no answer to the question of what level of technical
quality of videotaped or closed-circuit televised testimony is the func-
tional equivalent of live testimony.
3. Other Jurisdictions
The analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Commonwealth v. Bergstrom2 2 presents reasoning which defendants
278. Id.
279. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
280. 565 So. 2d at 317.
281. Id. at 318.
282. 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988).
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could use to challenge anew the statutes providing special protection
to child witnesses. Further, the analysis of the Massachusetts court
reveals some of the implications of bills that were before the Florida
Legislature in 1989 and 1990283 which would have made the special
protections currently available only to children available to the elderly
and the disabled.
Bergstrom involved the constitutionality of a one-way closed-circuit
television procedure under which the court allowed the transmission
of the testimony of two child witnesses from a separate room to the
courtroom. The court invoked the procedure pursuant to state statute.
The court decided Bergstrom after oral argument in Coy but before
the Court issued its opinion in that case.
In Bergstrom, only the defendant and the jury were present in the
courtroom when the court took the children's testimony via closed-
circuit television.2 The judge, counsel, the children's grandmother,
and a video technician were in a separate room. 285 No one explained
the process to the children. The children did not know the defendant
would be observing and listening to them, and neither child knew she
was giving testimony against the defendant in a court of law .86 The
jury was unaware of the grandmother's presence in the room when
each child testified.287
The defendant claimed the procedure violated his right to confron-
tation under the federal and state constitutions. The court decided the
case solely on the basis of the confrontation clause in the Massachu-
setts state constitutionn88 The state constitution provides that an ac-
cused has the right "to meet the witnesses against him face-to-
face. 9 2 8 9
The state statute provides the circumstances under which the court
can use a closed-circuit television procedure:
If, after a pretrial hearing, the judge finds by "a preponderance of
the evidence at the time of the order that the child witness is likely to
suffer psychological or emotional trauma as a result of testifying in
open court, as a result of testifying in the presence of the
defendant," or as a result of doing both, the judge shall enter
283. See infra text accompanying notes 343-48 and notes 356-59 for a discussion of the bills.
284. 402 Mass. at 539, 524 N.E.2d at 370.
285. Id., 524 N.E.2d at 370.
286. Id. at 540, 524 N.E.2d at 370.
287. Id. at 539, 524 N.E.2d at 370.
288. Id. at 535, 540 n.8, 524 N.E.2d at 367, 370 n.8.
289. Id. at 541, 524 N.E.2d at 371 (quoting MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 12).
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specific findings allowing use of the statutory alternatives [including
closed-circuit television] .29
The statute further provides that the defendant has a right to be pres-
ent during the use of a statutory alternative, unless the offering party.
shows that the witness is likely to suffer trauma as a result of testify-
ing in the presence of the defendant.2 9'
The court found that the plain meaning of the language in the state
constitution guaranteed the right to a direct confrontation between the
witness and the accused. 292 An interpretation that the provision's lan-
guage only gives the defendant the right to see and hear the witness
would render superfluous the words "to meet" and "face-to-face." 293
The court recognized limited exceptions to the requirements of con-
frontation. These exceptions included the unavailability of the wit-
ness, acknowledged exceptions to the literal right to confrontation
such as public records or dying declarations, and certain unique inter-
ests.29 However, the court pointed out that "[t]he recognized excep-
tions to the right of direct confrontation at trial are not crime
specific. 2 95 Furthermore, the court found that "[flor constitutional
purposes, no principled distinction can be drawn between a child wit-
ness and any other class whom the Legislature might in the future
deem in need of special treatment.' '29 Thus, the Massachusetts court
held that because the Massachusetts' Declaration of Rights' confron-
tation clause does not distinguish among categories of crime or classes
of witnesses, the state statute "creates a rule of witness protection that
is too broad to pass constitutional muster.' '297
The Massachusetts court noted that during oral argument in Coy,
the State of Iowa conceded the principle of exempting child witnesses
from direct confrontation is applicable to other categories of wit-
nesses.298 At oral argument in Coy, Justice Stevens asked counsel for
the state whether its argument for special protection of child wit-
nesses, if sound, would not "apply to older, equally traumatized wit-
nesses, such as 85 year old robbery victims. ' ' 299 Justice Scalia then
290. Id. at 537, 524 N.E.2d at 369 (quoting MAss. GEN. L. ch. 278 § 16D(b)(1) (1985)).
291. Id. at 537, 524 N.E.2d at 369.
292. Id. at 541-42, 524 N.E.2d at 371.
293. Id. at 542, 524 N.E.2d at 371.
294. Id. at 545, 524 N.E.2d at 373.
295. Id. at 546, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
296. Id. at 546-47, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
297. Id. at 547, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
298. Id. at n.13, 524 N.E.2d at 374 n.13.
299. 56 U.S.L.W. 3493, 3494 (Jan. 26, 1988).
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asked if the principle would apply to a fifty-five year old.?0 Counsel
for the state responded that the principle would apply in both cases.31'
While the Massachusetts court was aware that courts in other states
had reached a different conclusion, it disagreed with the reasoning of
those opinions.3° For example, it pointed out that some courts which
employed balancing tests in determining the constitutionality of a par-
ticular procedure failed to consider or explain how to distinguish the
state's interest from any other.303 The court expressed its willingness to
consider the validity of new techniques for the preservation and pres-
entation of evidence at a criminal trial on a case-by-case basis, but it
was unable to uphold broad categorical exemptions from constitu-
tional mandates. 3°4
While the court did not rule out the taking of testimony outside of
the presence of the defendant, it did find, for additional reasons, that
the trial court used inadequate procedures. First, the quality of the
television transmission was poor and did not allow the jury properly
to observe the witness' demeanor or to view the interaction between
the witness and others who were present.3 5 Second, a party must show
a compelling need for the use of the procedure by more than a mere
preponderance of the evidence:3 6
Such a compelling need could be shown where, by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the recording of the testimony of a child witness
outside the courtroom (but in the presence of the defendant) is
shown to be necessary so as to avoid severe and long lasting
emotional trauma to the child. 307
Finally, the court was particularly troubled that the statutory proce-
dure allowed the witness to testify outside of the presence of the de-
fendant and the jury without making the witness aware that she was
giving testimony against the accused in a court of law. 30 1
Recognizing the reasoning in Bergstrom, the lack of a constitutional
basis for special treatment of one category of witnesses over any other
category such as the elderly or the handicapped similarly troubled the
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 547 n.14, 524 N.E.2d 366, 374 n.14
(1988).
303. Id., 524 N.E.2d at 374 n.14 (citations omitted).
304. Id. at 547-48, 524 N.E.2d at 374-75.
305. Id. at 550, 524 N.E.2d at 376.
306. Id., 524 N.E.2d at 376.
307. Id. at 550-51, 524 N.E.2d at 376 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
308. Id. at 553, 524 N.E.2d at 377.
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Illinois Supreme Court when it held its videotape statute unconstitu-
tional.3°9 Indeed, one could argue that there is no apparent justifica-
tion for limiting special protection to any category or categories of
witnesses.
C. The Disabled and the Elderly
A limited number of states which make evidentiary special protec-
tions available to children also make protections available to others.
The statutes of six states make reference to affording the elderly or
disabled adults, or both, the special protections available to children.
Three of the six states specifically extend special evidentiary protec-
tion to the developmentally disabled. Two states have broadly worded
statutes which a court may interpret as providing special protection to
the aged and the disabled. One state affords special protection only to
child victims of certain crimes, but some of the crimes referenced can
have either elderly or child victims.
California, Minnesota, and Michigan specifically provide special ev-
identiary protection to the developmentally disabled or mentally im-
paired. California permits the prosecution to request that the
testimony of a victim taken at a preliminary hearing be recorded on
videotape, if the victim is fifteen years of age or less or is developmen-
tally disabled as a result of mental retardation.310 The videotape can
be admitted at trial, if the court finds that further testimony by the
victim would cause the victim emotional trauma to such an extent as
to make him or her unavailable."' California also has a procedure for
taking testimony via closed-circuit television, but it is available only to
child witnesses.3 1 2
Minnesota extends its hearsay exception, and arguably its videotape
procedure, to the mentally impaired. The state's closed-circuit televi-
sion procedure, however, is not available to the mentally impaired.
This latter procedure, like the California closed-circuit procedure, is
available only to child witnesses.
Minnesota's hearsay statute, subdivision 3 of section 595.02, pro-
vides
An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years
or a person who is mentally impaired as defined in section 609.341,
subdivision 6 alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act of
309. People v. Bastien, 129 I11. 2d 64, 79, 541 N.E.2d 670, 677 (1989).
310. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989).
311. Id.
312. Id. § 1347 (West Supp. 1989).
WITNESS TESTIMONY
sexual contact or penetration performed with or on the child or any
act of physical abuse of the child or the person who is mentally
impaired by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of
evidence, is admissible as substantive evidence .... "I
The statute defines mentally impaired to mean "that a person, as a
result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence or a substan-
tial psychiatric disorder of thought or mood, lacks the judgment to
give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration."'114
Although the language of subdivision 3 is not precisely parallel, pre-
sumably, the hearsay exception applies to out-of-court statements re-
lating to sexual contact or penetration, or to physical abuse, made by
children or the mentally impaired.
Arguably, a videotaped statement of a mentally impaired person is
admissible under the Minnesota law. "For purposes of [subdivision
3], an out-of-court statement includes video, audio, or other recorded
statements."3 5 Because subdivision 3 provides for the admission of
certain out-of-court statements by children under ten or the mentally
impaired, the videotaped statement of a mentally impaired person
would be an out-of-court statement which a court could admit under
the provision.
However, language in subdivision 4 of the same section casts doubt
on the conclusion that a videotaped statement of a mentally impaired
person would be admissible under subdivision 3. Subdivision 4 pro-
vides that a court may order a child's testimony be taken by closed-
circuit television or recorded for later showing to the jury:
In a proceeding in which a child less than ten years of age is alleging,
denying, or describing an act of physical abuse or an act of sexual
contact or penetration performed with or on the child by another,
the court may, upon its own motion or upon the motion of any
party, order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room other
than the courtroom or in the courtroom and televised at the same
time by closed-circuit equipment, or recorded for later showing to be
viewed by the jury in the proceeding. 316
The provision only refers to the testimony of a child, and not to that
of a mentally impaired person. The failure to reference the mentally
impaired militates against the conclusion that their videotaped state-
ments would be admissible under the statute.
313. MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subdiv. 3 (1988).
314. Id. § 609.341 subdiv. 6 (1988).
315. Id. § 595.02 subdiv. 3 (1988).
316. Id. § 595.02 subdiv. 4 (1988) (emphasis added).
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With respect to the taking of testimony via closed-circuit television,
the language of subdivisions 3 and 4 preclude the use of this proce-
dure for the mentally impaired. There is no reference to closed-circuit
television in subdivision 3, and subdivision 4 makes no reference to
the mentally impaired.
Michigan law provides for the admission at a court proceeding of a
videotaped deposition of a witness who is psychologically or emotion-
ally unable to give live testimony at the proceeding. 3 7 Under certain
circumstances, a witness may give testimony via closed-circuit televi-
sion.318 A witness, for purposes of either provision, is a person under
fifteen years of age or a person fifteen years of age or older with a
developmental disability. 3 9 The statute defines developmental disabil-
ity as an impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive
behavior which meets the following criteria: it originated before the
person became eighteen; it has been or can be expected to be continu-
ous; it is a substantial burden to the person's ability to perform nor-
mally in society; and it is attributable to mental retardation or some
similar condition .320
Two states, South Carolina and Montana, have broadly worded sta-
tutes that may make one or more of the special protections available
to the elderly or disabled. South Carolina's bill of rights for victims
and witnesses provides that "[v]ictims and witnesses who are very
young, elderly, who are handicapped or who have special needs, have
a right to special recognition and attention by all criminal justice...
agencies." ' 32' The court is to treat these special witnesses sensitively,
"using closed or taped sessions when appropriate."3 22 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina has interpreted the statute to permit the ad-
mission of the videotaped testimony of a three year old criminal sex-
ual assault victim. 323
The South Carolina law is the only state statute to make reference
to the elderly. To date no case has decided what, if any, specific spe-
cial protections are applicable to the aged under that law. Similarly,
no case has decided what protections apply to the "handicapped" or
to those "who have special needs." South Carolina has a separate
317. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2163a(13) (West 1989 Supp.).
318. Id. § 600.2163a(12)(a).
319. Id. § 600.2163a(l)(b)(i)-(iii).
320. Id. § 600.2163a(l)(a)(i)-(iv).
321. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
322. Id.
323. State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987).
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statutory hearsay exception for the statements of a victim of abuse or
neglect, but it only applies to the statements of a child victim.3 24
Montana has a very broadly worded statute providing for the ad-
missibility of videotaped testimony. The statute provides that for the
prosecution of certain sexual offenses, "the testimony of the victim,
at the request of such victim and with the concurrence of the prosecut-
ing attorney, may be recorded by means of videotape for presentation
at trial. 3 25 The prosecution may present such testimony at trial and
the court must receive it into evidence.3 2 The victim need not be pres-
ent when the court admits the videotape into evidence. 27 Thus, a vic-
tim of one of the named crimes, regardless of age or disability, can
give testimony by means of videotape. This author found no reported
cases that interpret this provision.
Texas has both videotape and closed-circuit television procedures.3 28
These procedures are available only to the child victim of certain enu-
merated offenses.3 29 The enumerated offenses include the offenses of
section 22.04, Texas Penal Code. 30 Section 22.04 makes it a criminal
offense to intentionally or negligently cause bodily injury to a child
who is fourteen years of age or younger or to an individual who is
sixty-five years of age or older. 33' Thus, Texas has specifically chosen
to make videotape and closed-circuit television procedures available
only to a child victim of a crime under section 22.04, even though the
same act also is a crime under the same statute when an elderly person
is the victim.
In summary, California, Minnesota, and Michigan provide special
protection to the developmentally disabled. Minnesota is the only
state providing a hearsay exception for the out-of-court statements of
the disabled. In two states, California and Michigan, the videotape
procedure available to children is also available to those who have
mental disabilities. It is uncertain whether Minnesota's videotape pro-
cedure is available to the mentally impaired. Michigan is the only state
in which the closed-circuit television procedure is available to the de-
velopmentally disabled. None of these states accords any of its special
protections to the elderly.
324. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1988).
325. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1987).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 §§ 3-4 (Vernon 1989).
329. Id. at art. 38.071 § 1.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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Two states, South Carolina and Montana, have broadly worded sta-
tutes providing special protections. South Carolina has the only stat-
ute which makes reference to the elderly. To date no case law in either
state has extended to the elderly or the developmentally disabled a
specific special protection. Finally, Texas' statutory scheme makes
videotape and closed-circuit television procedures available to a child
victim of certain enumerated offenses, but not to an elderly victim of
the same offenses.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Legislators introduced bills providing special protection to the eld-
erly and to disabled adults during the 1989 and 1990 Regular Sessions
of the Florida Legislature. There is no empirical evidence to support
the enactment of such legislation.
In 1988, the Attorney General of Florida received a federal grant to
create a task force to investigate and identify the impact of crime
against the elderly. 32 Between October 1988 and February 1989, the
task force held several public hearings around the state. 333
In its report, the task force made a number of findings. It found
that while the elderly are the most fearful of crime, statistically they
are, for the most part, the least likely victims of crimes. 3 4 Elderly
women are the most fearful of crime, but the least likely to suffer
from criminal acts. 35 The task force also found that sexual attacks
upon the elderly are rare. 336 An exception to the pattern of lower
crime rates for the elderly are crimes involving personal larceny with
contact.3 37 However, the rate of these crimes against the elderly is not
statistically different from that of other age groups .33
The task force also noted the phenomena of exploitation, abuse,
and neglect of the elderly by family members, home care-givers, and
institutional personnel. 3 9 The report contained no statistics on the
magnitude of these problems.
Despite the lack of empirical data showing disproportionate rates of
crimes against the elderly, or even an increasing trend in such crime
rates, the task force recommended legislation to protect the elderly
332. ATTORNEY GENErAtL's TASK FORCE ON CRUMES AND Tm ELDERLY: FINAL REPORT at 6
(1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
333. Id. at 58-62.
334. Id. at 8-15.
335. Id. at 10.
336. Id. at 15.
337. Id. at 9.
338. Id. (citation omitted).
339. Id. at 18-21.
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and the mentally or physically disabled from the stress of testifying at
trial. Specifically, the task force recommended an amendment to
chapter 92, Florida Statutes, to provide for videotaping the testimony
of the elderly and of disabled adults for use at trial.14
The task force made the recommendation, in part, because such
protection is available to children who are alleged victims of abuse. 34'
The analogy is misleading. The enactment of special protections for
child victims of sexual abuse was, in part, a reaction to a significant
increase in the reporting of such crimes. 42 There are no empirical data
showing a corresponding increase in reported incidents of criminal
sexual abuse of the elderly or of disabled adults that would bolster the
argument for special protection at trial for this group.
A 1989 Senate bill embodied the task force's recommendation to
amend chapter 92. The bill would have created a new section estab-
lishing the circumstances under which aged or disabled persons could
testify on videotape.3 43 The bill had no House companion and died in
the Senate Committee on Judiciary-Civil. 34 There was no comparable
bill for consideration during the 1990 Regular Session.
Legislators also introduced House and Senate bills at the 1989 Reg-
ular Session which would have amended all three of the protections
available to children, i.e., the hearsay exception, the videotape provi-
sion, and the closed-circuit television provision, to make them availa-
ble to "aged persons" and "disabled adults." ' 341 The sponsor of the
House bill was a member of the task force.34 The House passed the
bill, but it died in Senate committee.347 The Senate bill died without a
committee hearing 48
During the interim between the 1989 and 1990 Regular Sessions, the
President of the Senate directed staff of the Florida Senate Committee
on Judiciary-Civil to study the Senate bills relating to evidence the
President had referred to that committee, but which the committee
did not hear. The President anticipated that sponsors would file simi-
340. Id. at 29.
341. Id.
342. Bulkley, supra note 61, at 6.
343. Compare SB 951 (1989) with TASK FORCE, supra note 332, at 56-57.
344. FLA. LEois., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1989 REG LAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 162, SB 951.
345. See Fla. HB 835 (1989); SB 668 (1989).
346. Rep. Elaine Gordon, Dem., North Miami. See Fla. HB 835 (1989); TASK FORCE, supra
note 332, at 2.
347. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1989 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BInLS
at 364, HB 835.
348. Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 126, SB 668.
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lar bills for consideration during the 1990 Regular Session.3 49 Among
the Senate bills the staff studied were the two 1989 Senate bills. 350
For two reasons, staff concluded that such legislation was prema-
ture. First, such proposals lacked an empirical basis. Staff noted that
there was even less empirical research to support the need for expand-
ing the protections afforded to children to the disabled and the elderly
than there was to support providing special protection to children in
the first instance.35" ' Second, the unsettled state of the case law with
respect to state statutes providing special protection to children fur-
ther militated against expanding such protections to other categories
of witnesses. 32 Based upon these recommendations, the Committee
agreed not to present such legislation as a Committee Bill at the 1990
Regular Session.353
During the 1989-1990 interim, the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee
also requested The Florida Bar Standing Committee on Code and
Rules of Evidence to review the two 1989 Senate bills. 354 The bar com-
mittee voted unanimously to oppose each of them.355
As anticipated, lawmakers filed a bill to extend the three protec-
tions to aged persons and disabled adults in each house for considera-
tion during the 1990 Regular Session.356 Each bill had the same
sponsor as the previous year.357 Again, the House passed the bill but it
died in Senate committee. 358 Again, the Senate bill died without a
hearing .3 9
349. OFFICE OF THE PRES., THE FLORIDA SENATE 1989-90 INTERIM PROJECTS at 30 (July 1989)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
350. See STAFF OF FLA. S. Com. ON JuDicaRY-Civ., A REviEw OF 1989 PROPOSED LEGISLA-
TION AmENDING FLORIDA STATUTES RELATING TO EVIDENCE (Mar. 1990) (available at Fla. Dep't
of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.)
[hereinafter REvmw OF 1989 PROPOSED LEGISI.ATION].
351. Id. at 45-47.
352. Id. at 216-218.
353. See Letter from Clint Smawley, Staff Dir., Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ. to Sen.
Jean Malchon, Dem., St. Petersburg (Feb 13, 1990) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of
Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). Sen. Malchon spon-
sored the 1989 and 1990 Senate Bills, SB 668 and SB 134, respectively, which would have ex-
panded the protections to the aged and the disabled.
354. Letter from Glenn Lang, Legis. Analyst, Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ. to William
Corley, Chair, Fla. Bar Standing Comm. on Code and Rules of Evid. (Aug. 4, 1989) (available
at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Talla-
hassee, Fla.).
355. REvEEw OF 1989 PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 350, at 50.
356. See Fla. HB 2459 (1990); SB 134 (1990).
357. Id. (Rep. Gordon and Sen. Malchon, respectively).
358. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1990 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BELLS
at 413, HB 2459.
359. Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILS at 38, SB 134.
WITNESS TESTIMONY
V. CONCLUSION
Lawmakers filed bills in both the 1989 0and the 1990 Regular Ses-
sions of the Florida Legislature to make available to aged persons and
disabled adults the special procedures available under Florida law for
taking the testimony of an alleged child victim of abuse. One can un-
derstand the ramifications of these proposals only in the context of
the history of, and the legal controversy surrounding, the special pro-
cedures available to children.
The origin of the movement in the legal community to enact special
procedures for taking the testimony of children dates back at least to
1969. The movement culminated in the mid-1980s with the enactment
of laws in a number of states providing a hearsay exception for the
statements of an alleged child victim and permitting an alleged child
victim to testify at trial by videotape or via closed-circuit television.
Florida enacted such laws.
In general, states enacted these statutes in response to a reported
increase in the number of incidents of sexual assault on children.
Their enactment coincided with a general movement to protect victims
of crime.
However, at the time of these statutes' enactment, there were no
empirical studies which attempted to document that, in fact, testifying
in open court traumatizes child victims. Since the enactment of these
laws, Goodman's study has attempted to empirically show this. She
found that testifying adversely affected a subset of children who testi-
fied. However, it is not unlikely that testifying adversely affects a sub-
set of any category of victim witnesses. Moreover, there are no
comparative studies, then or now, which document that the negative
effects on certain child victims who testify are any greater than the
negative effects on certain other victims who fall within a particular
category of victim witnesses.
The circumstances surrounding the proposals in Florida to make the
procedures available to the elderly and to disabled adults are much the
same as they were in the early stages of the movement to provide spe-
cial procedures to children. There are no empirical studies document-
ing that testifying in open court particularly traumatizes aged or
disabled victims. Similarly, there are no comparative studies showing
that testifying traumatizes victim witnesses in either category more
than others.
The legislation recently proposed in Florida would make all three of
the special procedures currently available to children available to the
aged and the disabled. These proposals are related to the recommen-
dation of a Florida Attorney General's task force for enactment of
such legislation. The task force made that recommendation despite a
19911
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lack of data showing a disproportionate rate of crime against either
category. In contrast, the enactment of special procedures for children
was at least coincidental with a reported increase in sexual offenses
involving children.
To date, no state clearly makes its special procedures available to
the elderly. Only three states make available to the disabled one or
more of the special procedures that the particular state makes availa-
ble to children.
Irrespective of the lack of empirical support for making Florida's
special procedures available to the aged or the disabled, expanding the
use of such procedures raises both legal and practical questions. These
arise from recent case law.
Given the United States Supreme Court decision in Maryland v.
Craig, Florida's special procedures for children would seem secure
against a challenge that they violate a defendant's constitutional right
of confrontation. However, in light of the opinion of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Bergstrom, the statutes may be sub-
ject to challenge on other grounds.
Noting the questions Justices Stevens and Scalia posed at the oral
argument in Coy regarding the potential for application of the Iowa
statute to elderly persons, the Massachusetts court in Bergstrom rea-
soned that the state's videotape statute was unconstitutional because it
applied only to children and was crime specific. The application of
Florida's statutes is limited similarly. The statute in Texas illustrates
the incongruity of such a limitation. That law provides special proce-
dures for taking the testimony of a child victim of certain enumerated
criminal statutes, but one of the enumerated statutes makes it a crime
to injure a person who is fourteen years of age or younger or a person
who is sixty-five years of age or older.
The legislation proposed in Florida would add the aged and the dis-
abled to the list of those to whom the special procedures are available.
While this proposal addresses the incongruity that the Texas statute
illustrates, it does not fully recognize the reasoning of the Massachu-
setts court in Bergstrom. Thus, one could argue that the special proce-
dures should be available not only to aged persons and disabled adults
who are alleged victims of certain crimes. Rather, they should be
available to any alleged victim of any crime.
However, a broader application of the special procedures, whether
the procedures become available to the elderly and the disabled or to
any witness, calls for even closer scrutiny of the showing Craig re-
quires to invoke a special procedure. Under Craig, a trial court may
invoke a special procedure only after it has received evidence and
made a case-specific finding that the procedure is necessary because
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testifying in the presence of the defendant would adversely affect the
child victim.
In Leggett, the Florida Supreme Court indicated that the testimony
of a single social worker to the effect that testifying would emotion-
ally damage the alleged child victim and put him back in his school
work was sufficient evidence to invoke Florida's videotape procedure.
However, the substance of the social worker's testimony amounts to
no more than a prediction that testifying in the presence of the defen-
dant would cause the child to react in certain ways after so testifying.
This is a different and more speculative prediction than the require-
ment of the Maryland statute which the United States Supreme Court
upheld. Under the Maryland statute, the required prediction is that
testifying in the presence of the defendant will result in serious emo-
tional distress such that the alleged child victim cannot reasonably
communicate.
Regardless of which of these predictions the court requires, the abil-
ity of social workers, psychologists, or psychiatrists to make such
predictions accurately is unknown. With respect to the field of psy-
chology, the APA, in its amicus brief in Craig, acknowledged this ina-
bility when it stated that "research data concerning the factors that
predict high stress and/or lasting distress for child-victim witnesses is
[sic] still being developed. . . . "6 The APA noted that due to ethical
and practical constraints, systematic field research in this area is ex-
tremely difficult to conduct. 361 Thus, at best it will be a long time be-
fore empirical data demonstrate that psychologists accurately can
predict whether a child would be so affected by confronting the defen-
dant face-to-face that the child should be permitted to testify in an
alternative manner. Given that no research currently is testing the
ability of psychologists to make similar predictions with respect to
other categories of witnesses such as the elderly or the disabled, em-
pirical data demonstrating that the profession is capable of making
such predictions with respect to these categories of witnesses will be
even longer in coming, if at all.3 62
360. Brief for the American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae at 14, Maryland v.
Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
361. Id. n.28.
362. Until such data can be developed for child victim witnesses, the APA argued that "clin-
ical data and psychological theory provide a framework from which conclusions about [the]
question [of predicting high stress and/or lasting stress] may be drawn." Id. In support of this
argument, the APA offered an untested theoretical model recently postulated by two academics.
The theory was offered as a "framework for analyzing the emotional consequences of a possible
face-to-face encounter between the child victim-witness and a defendant known to the child."
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Other than by producing expert testimony to the contrary, a defen-
dant has no way of exercising the literal right of confrontation.
Should this result in a battle of experts in such cases, the procedure
would do a disservice to the child victim by repeatedly bringing up a
painful subject. The procedure could further burden an already over-
whelmed criminal court system because the law would require it to
spend more time holding hearings to determine the necessity for such
procedures. Making Florida's special procedures available to other
categories of witnesses would only exacerbate these potential prob-
lems.
The Florida Legislature carefully should consider these legal and
practical questions before deciding to expand the use of the special
procedures for taking the testimony of children. If it decides to ex-
pand their use, these questions should be considered in deciding to
whom it should make such procedures available. Only by such careful
deliberation can the Legislature be fully cognizant of the ramifications
of enacting such laws.
Id. at 15.
The theory consists of four factors: "traumatic sexualization," "betrayal," "powerlessness,"
and "stigmatization." Traumatic sexualization describes a process of shaping a child's sexuality
in developmentally inappropriate ways. Id. at 15. The second factor, betrayal, occurs when a
child learns that he or she has been misled into submitting to sexual activities by kindness and
affection and that such activities are wrong. Id. (footnote omitted). A sense of powerlessness
occurs because the abuse subverts the will and desires of the child. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
Finally, stigmatization refers to the negative connotations, e.g., badness, shame, and guilt, that
are communicated to the child as a result of the sexual abuse experience and that are later incor-
porated into his or her self-image. Id. (footnote omitted). Under the theory, confrontation may
arouse each of these factors and thereby adversely affect the child. Id. at 15-16.
It can be argued that the usefulness of these factors in predicting whether a particular child
would be traumatized by confronting the defendant face-to-face assumes that the defendant, in
fact, committed the crime. Thus, at least from the defense counsel's point of view, the use of a
special procedure based upon the expert testimony of a psychologist that the alleged child victim
witness is afflicted by one or more of these factors prejudices the defendant.
